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Recognition Without Resourcing: Implementing Indonesia's Climate Village Programme in an Urban Neighbourhood

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia's Climate Village Programme (Program Kampung Iklim, ProKlim) relies on neighbourhood communities to carry out climate adaptation and mitigation, while the state provides guidance and recognition. This study examines how the programme is implemented at community level and what sustains it. Using a qualitative single case study and Edwards III's implementation model, we studied an award-winning neighbourhood in Bandung, West Java, through interviews with an urban village official, the neighbourhood ProKlim chair, and two residents, together with observation and documents. The neighbourhood rose from the Pratama category in 2023 to the Madya category in 2024, yet all activities were financed by residents' contributions. There was no budget from the urban village or the environment agency, eight committee members carried the work, and one agency facilitator served the whole sub-district. The chair estimated that about half of the residents were active and understood the programme. Maggot cultivation was suspended for lack of funds, broken equipment was replaced by the committee, and no letter of assignment had been issued. Residents mostly took part at household level, and some found waste separation burdensome. We describe this pattern as recognition without resourcing, in which high committee commitment compensates for weak resources and structure. Linking awards to funding, facilitation, and a formal mandate would make community climate action less dependent on a few volunteers. The study covers one neighbourhood and a small number of informants, so its findings transfer analytically rather than statistically.

Keywords: Climate Village Programme; Policy Implementation; Community-Based Adaptation; Co-Production; Volunteer Capacity

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INTRODUCTION

Climate change calls for adaptation and mitigation not only at the national level but also in the communities where its effects are felt. Cities concentrate emissions, people, and exposure to hazards such as flooding and heat, and much of the practical work of climate governance takes place in neighbourhoods rather than in ministries (Bulkeley, 2010). Indonesia ratified the Paris Agreement through Law No. 16 of 2016, and one of the instruments that carries the climate agenda down to residents is the Climate Village Programme (Program Kampung Iklim, ProKlim). The programme speaks directly to

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Sustainable Development Goal 13 on climate action and, through its reliance on local institutions, to the goal of effective and inclusive institutions under SDG 16 (United Nations, 2015).

Regulation of the Minister of Environment and Forestry No. P.84/MENLHK-SETJEN/KUM.1/11/2016 defines ProKlim as a national programme, managed by the ministry, to increase community involvement in climate adaptation and mitigation and to give recognition for such efforts. The smallest eligible unit is a neighbourhood (rukun warga, RW) or hamlet. The regulation sets award categories by final score, namely Pratama, Madya, Nominasi Utama, and Nominasi Lestari, and names the national budget, regional budgets, and other lawful sources as sources of funding. It also assigns guidance, facilitation, and coordination to the central and regional governments, supported by businesses, universities, and non-governmental organizations.

This design positions the community as the main implementer and the state as both supervisor and source of recognition. The literature on community-based adaptation argues that local climate action should start from the priorities, knowledge, and capacities of communities themselves (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009; Kirkby et al., 2018). Yet community-based implementation also raises the question of who bears the cost and the labour of implementation. Co-production theory holds that citizen contributions generate synergy only when the inputs of the state and of citizens complement one another (Ostrom, 1996). Where the state contributes recognition but few material resources, the burden may shift quietly to a small group of residents.

Studies of ProKlim implementation in Indonesia report recurring obstacles. In a village in Magelang Regency, the ProKlim working group had not yet functioned optimally, and facilities and infrastructure remained insufficient (Riani et al., 2024). Research in another village in the same regency examined the factors that shaped implementation (Anugerah & Sinaga, 2025). Such studies tend to stop at a list of constraints. Less attention has been paid to how a community still manages to earn recognition despite those constraints, and to what this means for the sustainability of the programme. The question matters because the award system is the programme's most visible output: if awards can be earned without public funding, they may signal success while concealing fragile foundations.

This article examines ProKlim implementation in one neighbourhood in the city of Bandung that moved from the Pratama category in 2023 to the Madya category in 2024. The case is of interest because this progress occurred without any government budget at neighbourhood level. The study asks: (1) how is ProKlim implemented in terms of communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure; (2) what constraints does implementation face; and (3) what measures are taken to address them? We argue that the case reveals a pattern of recognition without resourcing, in which the state grants recognition while the costs and labour of implementation are borne by the committee and residents. The article proceeds with a review of the literature, the methods, the results and discussion, and the conclusions and suggestions for future research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Edwards III's Implementation Model

Edwards III (1980) identified four factors that shape policy implementation. *Communication* covers the transmission, clarity, and consistency of policy information from policymakers to implementers and target groups. *Resources* include staff, budget, facilities, information, and authority. *Disposition* refers to the attitudes and commitment of implementers, including the effect of incentives on their willingness to act. *Bureaucratic structure* covers standard operating procedures and the fragmentation of responsibility among units. The model belongs to the top-down tradition of implementation research, which asks whether the conditions specified by a policy are present where it is carried out (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).

The model is widely used in Indonesian implementation research because its dimensions are easy to operationalize in interviews. Its limitation for this study is that it was designed for implementation by bureaucracies, whereas the main implementers of ProKlim are community volunteers who are not paid by the state. The four dimensions therefore need to be read with care. Resources, for instance, include not only what the state provides but also what volunteers mobilize, and disposition concerns not only officials but also unpaid committee members and residents. This article uses the four dimensions as an assessment framework and interprets the findings through the literature on co-production and community-based adaptation.

Policy Ambiguity and Experimental Implementation

Matland (1995) classified implementation by the degree of policy ambiguity and conflict. Policies with low conflict but high ambiguity produce experimental implementation, in which outcomes depend heavily on contextual conditions and on the actors who are active locally. ProKlim fits this description.

Almost no one opposes its goals, but the form of activities, sources of funding, and the division of roles at local level are not specified in detail. The regulation lists the components that are scored, yet leaves open who should pay for them and how local governments should support communities. We therefore expect ProKlim outcomes in any given location to depend strongly on who drives the programme and what resources they can assemble. Matland's model also implies a risk: under experimental implementation, success in one place may owe more to local champions than to the programme design, and it may not travel to places without such champions.

Co-Production and Community-Based Adaptation

Co-production refers to the involvement of citizens in producing public services together with formal providers. Ostrom (1996) showed that co-production yields synergy when the inputs of the state and of citizens complement each other, and Bovaird (2007) argued that user and community co-production changes the relationship between professionals and citizens in ways that require new forms of support. Brandsen and Honingh (2016) distinguish types of co-production according to whether citizens take part in the design or the implementation of services, while Nabatchi et al. (2017) classify co-production by who participates (individuals, groups, or collectives), at what stage, and with what output. A systematic review by Voorberg et al. (2015) found that the success of co-production depends on organizational willingness to support citizens and on citizens' own capacities and sense of ownership. Experimental evidence also shows that government initiatives that provide basic resources can raise citizen co-production (Jakobsen, 2013).

ProKlim can be understood as collective co-production at the implementation stage. The community runs activities, while the state is expected to provide guidance, funding, and recognition. The community-based adaptation literature makes a similar point from a different starting place. Ayers and Forsyth (2009) emphasize that community-based adaptation gives room to local priorities and capacities, but still requires support from outside the community. Forsyth (2013) and Dodman and Mitlin (2013) caution that community approaches can romanticize local capacity and shift responsibility onto poor or volunteer-based groups unless they are linked to wider institutions and resources. Kirkby et al. (2018) add that community-based adaptation is sustained only when it is integrated into local planning and budgets.

Research on volunteering adds a further concern. Volunteer work depends on time, resources, and social ties, and it tends to be concentrated among a small share of the population (Wilson, 2000). Programmes that rely on volunteers without compensating them risk fatigue and turnover among the few who carry the work. Studies of urban climate governance similarly show that local experiments become durable only when they are institutionalized in budgets, mandates, and organizational routines (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011). Taken together, these literatures suggest an analytical question that the implementation literature alone does not pose: which state inputs are actually present in a ProKlim location, and which are being substituted by the community?

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research Design and Case

We used a qualitative descriptive approach with a single case study design, which suits the study of a contemporary programme in its real-life setting (Yin, 2018). The study site was RW 08 in Cisaranten Kulon urban village (kelurahan), Arcamanik sub-district, Bandung. The neighbourhood was selected because it received the ProKlim Pratama award in 2023 and the Madya award in 2024, while facing limited resources and participation. The combination of rising recognition and visible constraints made it a revealing case for examining how a community sustains the programme. The case was bounded as the implementation of ProKlim within RW 08 during the period between the two awards and the months that followed, and it included the relationships between the neighbourhood committee, the urban village administration, and the city environment agency as they bore on that implementation. Activities that the neighbourhood carried out under the city's Kang Pisman and Buruan Sae programmes were included where informants treated them as part of ProKlim, because the boundary between the programmes was itself one of the issues under study.

Cisaranten Kulon covers 173.091 hectares and is divided into 13 neighbourhoods (RW) and 79 neighbourhood units (RT), with 23,264 residents (11,677 men and 11,587 women) in about 7,588

households. RW 08 comprises six RT. The area is flat, lies about 500 metres above sea level, and has temperatures of 19.0 to 34 °C and annual rainfall of about 874 mm.

Policy and Local Context

Under Ministerial Regulation P.84/2016, guidance for ProKlim, including facilitation and support, is provided by the central and regional governments and by ProKlim supporters such as businesses, universities, and non-governmental organizations. Governors, regents, and mayors appoint ProKlim coordinators in their areas. The Pratama category is awarded for a final score of up to 50 percent, Madya for 51 to 80 percent, and Nominasi Utama for scores above 81 percent. Funding may come from the national budget, regional budgets, and other lawful sources.

In Bandung, ProKlim at the study site grew out of two city programmes: Kang Pisman (an acronym for reducing, separating, and using waste) run by the city environment agency, and Buruan Sae (healthy, natural, and economical home yards) run by the city food and agriculture agency. According to city environment agency data for 2023 cited in the research documents, the city produces about 1,500 tonnes of waste per day, of which only about half is managed properly. The city also has Regional Regulation No. 1 of 2023 on Environmental Protection and Management.

Informants and Data Collection

Fieldwork ran from September 2024 to February 2025. Informants were selected purposively to cover the three levels at which the programme is implemented: the urban village administration, the neighbourhood committee, and residents (Table 1). Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews based on a guide organized by Edwards III's four dimensions, through observation of programme facilities and activities, and through documents. Two residents gave their accounts in writing. Secondary data included regulations, the urban village profile, and ProKlim documents. Interviews were conducted in Indonesian, and the excerpts below were translated by the authors.

Table 1. Research informants

Code	Position	Data
I1	Head of Economic and Development Section, urban village	Interview, 7 January 2025
I2	Chair of ProKlim, RW 08	Interview, 27 December 2024
W1	Resident of RW 08	Written account
W2	Resident of RW 08	Written account

Source: research data, 2025.

Data Analysis and Trustworthiness

Data were analyzed with the interactive model of Miles et al. (2014), comprising data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Interview transcripts and written accounts were first coded by Edwards III's four dimensions. Material that did not fit these codes, such as the committee's own incentive scheme and residents' views of waste separation as troublesome, was coded inductively and later used to interpret the dimensions. The coded material was displayed in a matrix comparing the accounts of the urban village, the committee, and residents for each dimension (Table 2).

Trustworthiness was supported by comparing the accounts of the urban village official, the committee chair, and residents, and by checking these accounts against observation and programme documents (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Where the accounts differed, for example on whether facilities were adequate, both views are reported. Figures such as the share of active residents are presented as informants' estimates rather than measured values.

Research Ethics

Informants took part voluntarily after being told the purpose of the study. Officials are identified by position, and residents by code only. The study was conducted with the cooperation of the urban

village administration and the neighbourhood committee, and the data were used only for the purposes of this research.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results are presented by Edwards III's four dimensions, followed by the constraints and measures reported by informants. The discussion then interprets the findings against the literature reviewed above.

Overview of ProKlim Implementation

ProKlim in RW 08 carries the vision "Selamatkan Bumi Kita Bersama" (SABUKI, Let Us Save Our Earth Together). Its mission includes increasing participation and food security, supporting government adaptation and mitigation programmes, and collaborating with government, business, and community organizations. Activities include composting, maggot cultivation, production of liquid fertilizer, tree planting, and urban farming. The neighbourhood received the ProKlim Pratama award from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2023 and moved up to ProKlim Madya in 2024.

Communication

The programme was communicated to residents mainly through outreach meetings. The ProKlim chair judged that its reach was still incomplete:

> *"In terms of communication, we have made various efforts to convey information about the Climate Village Programme to residents. One of the main methods is outreach. The aim is to make sure residents understand the benefits and goals of ProKlim. However, we still face challenges in reaching the whole community. At the moment, in percentage terms, only about 50 percent of residents are really active and understand the benefits and goals of this programme. Others are less involved, perhaps because of lack of time, awareness, or priority for environmental issues." (I2, 27 December 2024)*

Clarity had not yet been achieved either. The chair acknowledged that some residents were confused, and a resident's account confirmed this:

> *"The information is there, like about separating waste and planting trees. But sometimes I am confused about where to start and which step is most important. So sometimes I just listen and have not taken part much." (W1)*

In terms of consistency, guidance from the city environment agency was considered fairly clear, but facilitation was rare:

> *"In running ProKlim we do get direction from the city environment agency, but their facilitation is very rare, because there is only one officer for the whole sub-district, so it is hard to provide regular support. The information is actually quite clear, but sometimes there are changes or additional instructions that we have to adjust to on our own without direct guidance. So we try to collaborate with universities and environmental communities to keep the activities going." (I2, 27 December 2024)*

Resources

Human resources. Only eight committee members were active, and activities often rested on a few people:

> *"In implementing ProKlim in the field, we are constrained by the number of people. The ProKlim committee at RW level has only eight members. Active participation from the community is also not yet optimal, so the activities we plan are often carried out by only a handful of people. But we try to give the committee an incentive from residents' contributions to keep their spirits up." (I2, 27 December 2024)*

The urban village supported the programme but had no dedicated staff for it:

> *"From the urban village side, we support ProKlim, but there is indeed no specific allocation of human resources. This is a constraint, especially in coordinating activities and providing adequate technical support. Ideally there would be a special team or additional staff focusing on this programme." (I1, 7 January 2025)*

Budget. All activities were financed by residents' contributions, and the shortage of funds forced some activities to stop:

> *"For ProKlim activities, so far we still rely on contributions from residents. Of course this is very limited and only enough for small needs, and there is no budget in the form of money given directly by the environment agency. We hope for support from other parties, such as corporate social responsibility programmes, to help with funding. As a result some activities, such as maggot*

cultivation, have had to be stopped temporarily so we can prioritize more important ones." (I2, 27 December 2024)

"So far, we at the urban village do not yet have a specific budget allocation for ProKlim. Funding is mostly self-financed by the community through contributions. We keep trying to find solutions so that there is better support." (I1, 7 January 2025)

At the time of the study, no corporate social responsibility funding had been received.

Equipment. Basic equipment was considered adequate, but its maintenance fell to the committee, and separation was limited because there was no waste bank:

"The equipment we use to run ProKlim is quite adequate, such as a vehicle for transporting waste, a temporary waste collection point, and facilities for separating waste. We also have vacant land that can be used for processing waste or for other activities such as urban farming and tree planting. The environment agency also provides equipment, but if something breaks, we have to replace it at our own cost. There is no waste bank yet, so separation is limited to processing organic waste through maggot cultivation and making organic fertilizer with the Zerosima method. So the waste we separate is only organic waste and inorganic waste that has economic value, and the rest we still send to the landfill." (I2, 27 December 2024)

The urban village official stated that the specific needs of ProKlim were mostly met by residents' self-help or by assistance from the agency, and named the absence of a waste bank as a concern. A resident considered the existing facilities helpful:

"The facilities are quite helpful, like having a place to dispose of waste. We also see activities like tree planting and waste processing." (W2)

Disposition

The committee and the urban village showed commitment, but residents' participation was limited to household activities, and there were no incentives:

"We at the urban village strongly support ProKlim, but there are still many challenges, especially in terms of community participation. Most residents only take part in household activities, such as separating waste, and rarely take part in community activities. We also realize that no incentives have been given to implementers or to the community." (I1, 7 January 2025)

"As implementers, we have done our best to run this programme, but it is not easy. Community participation is very limited; most people only separate waste at home. We want them to be more active in community activities such as greening or processing waste together. There are also no incentives for implementers yet. If there were more support from the urban village or other parties, it might be easier to mobilize the community." (I2, 27 December 2024)

Among residents, waste separation was felt to be a burden:

"Actually we support this programme, but sometimes separating waste feels like a hassle. If possible it would be better to put all the waste together, because separating it feels complicated

and sometimes it smells. If there were an easier way or a more practical system, we might be keener to take part." (W1)

Bureaucratic Structure

For standard procedures, both the committee and the urban village referred to Ministerial Regulation P.84/2016 as technical guidance. The division of responsibility had not been formalized, however. No letter of assignment had been issued for the ProKlim committee:

"Until now, the letter of assignment has not been issued. I am not sure whether it is actually required for ProKlim, but we are preparing it and still consulting with the urban village and the environment agency to find out what is best." (I2, 27 December 2024)

"At the moment we have not issued a letter of assignment specifically for ProKlim, because in our view ProKlim is still part of the Kang Pisman and Buruan Sae programmes. But we are ready to issue one if needed so that the division of responsibility works effectively." (I1, 7 January 2025)

Table 2. Summary of findings by Edwards III's dimensions

Dimension	Main findings	Assessment
Communication	Outreach through residents' meetings and communal work; about half of residents active and informed (chair's estimate); residents unsure of concrete steps; rare facilitation by the agency (one officer per sub-district)	Not yet optimal
Resources	Eight active committee members; no dedicated urban village staff; funding entirely from residents' contributions; no agency, urban village, or CSR funds; maggot cultivation suspended; equipment repairs paid by the committee; no waste bank	Main constraint
Disposition	High commitment of committee and urban village; residents' participation limited to households; no incentives; separation seen as troublesome	High among committee, low among residents
Bureaucratic structure	Procedures follow Ministerial Regulation P.84/2016; no letter of assignment; ProKlim treated as part of Kang Pisman and Buruan Sae	Not yet optimal

Source: research data, 2025.

Constraints and Measures

Four constraints stood out: the small committee of eight people, the scarcity of facilitation from the agency, which had a single facilitator for the sub-district, dependence on residents' contributions for funding, and the absence of a letter of assignment. The measures taken included paying the committee a small incentive from residents' contributions, collaborating with universities, environmental communities, and non-governmental organizations to fill the gap in facilitation, setting priorities by temporarily suspending maggot cultivation, seeking corporate social responsibility support, and consulting the urban village and the agency on a letter of assignment. The urban village stated that it was ready to issue such a letter.

Recognition Without Resourcing

The most striking finding is the contrast between recognition and funding. RW 08 moved up from Pratama to Madya, yet received no budget from the urban village or the agency. Funding came from residents' contributions, broken equipment was replaced by the committee, and maggot cultivation was suspended for lack of money. Ministerial Regulation P.84/2016 names national and regional budgets and other sources as sources of funding, and assigns guidance to the central and regional governments. At the study site, the state inputs that were actually present were technical guidelines, initial equipment,

general direction, and the award itself. Regular facilitation, a budget, and formal legitimacy in the form of a letter of assignment were absent.

We call this pattern recognition without resourcing. In Ostrom's (1996) terms, co-production synergy requires complementary inputs. In this case, the state's input was mainly symbolic and normative, while material inputs were borne by the community. ProKlim thus functioned more as a mechanism for recognizing residents' self-help than as a programme that finances climate action. Voorberg et al. (2015) found that co-production succeeds where public organizations are willing to support citizens, and Jakobsen (2013) showed that modest government support can raise citizen input. The case suggests the reverse dynamic: where support is thin, co-production continues only as far as a committed few can carry it. The pattern does not mean that the programme failed. The rise in category shows that the community was able to achieve. That achievement, however, rested on fragile resources.

Disposition as a Buffer for Missing Resources

Edwards III's model treats its four dimensions as parallel factors. This case points to a more specific relationship, in which the high disposition of the committee compensated for deficits in resources and structure. The committee ran activities without a budget, without a letter of assignment, and with rare facilitation. It even created its own incentive from residents' contributions to keep members motivated. When the agency could not provide facilitation, the committee turned to universities and environmental communities.

This finding fits the character of experimental implementation in Matland's (1995) model. ProKlim combines low conflict and high ambiguity, so its outcomes depend on the local actors who are active. In RW 08, those actors were eight committee members. The consequence is that the programme's success depends on the presence and stamina of the same people. If committee members stop or burn out, no formal structure, budget, or mandate can take their place. Research on volunteering shows that unpaid work tends to concentrate among a small share of people and depends on their time and resources (Wilson, 2000). The small, self-financed incentive described by the chair can be read as an attempt to slow this attrition, but it draws on the same limited pool of residents' contributions that funds the activities themselves.

Household Participation Versus Collective Participation

Both the committee and the urban village reported that most residents' participation was limited to separating waste at home, while collective activities such as greening and shared waste processing were carried out by a few people. In the typology of Nabatchi et al. (2017), the programme was designed as collective co-production, but in practice most residents took part only as individuals. Residents' accounts explain part of the reason. They did not know where to start, and separation was felt to be complicated and smelly. The absence of a waste bank also limited the benefits of separating inorganic waste, because only items with economic value were separated and the rest still went to landfill.

Low collective participation is therefore not only a matter of awareness. It is also shaped by the clarity of concrete steps, the convenience of the system, and the availability of an outlet for separated waste. This reading is consistent with the conclusion of Voorberg et al. (2015) that citizens' willingness to co-produce depends on their capacity and on the practical arrangements around them, and with the warning by Dodman and Mitlin (2013) that community approaches shift burdens onto residents when the supporting infrastructure is missing.

An Unformalized Structure

The absence of a letter of assignment reflects the ambiguous status of ProKlim in the structure of local government. The urban village regarded ProKlim as part of Kang Pisman and Buruan Sae, while the ProKlim chair was unsure whether a letter of assignment was needed. As a result, the committee implemented a national programme without a formal mandate from local government, even though Ministerial Regulation P.84/2016 places regional governments in charge of guidance and coordination. The lack of a mandate made coordination depend on informal relationships and made it harder for the committee to obtain official support.

The point echoes the observation by Anguelovski and Carmin (2011) that urban climate initiatives endure only when they are institutionalized in mandates, budgets, and routines. It also reflects the concern of Kirkby et al. (2018) that community-based adaptation remains marginal unless it is integrated

into local planning. In this case, ProKlim sat between a national award scheme and two city programmes, without a clear home in the urban village's own plans.

Policy Implications

Several implications follow. First, the city government and urban villages should link ProKlim awards to financial support, for example through urban village budget allocations for ProKlim sites that have received awards. Second, the facilitation capacity of the environment agency should be increased, or the role of facilitators from universities and community organizations should be formalized so that it does not depend on the committee's initiative. Third, the urban village should issue a letter of assignment for the ProKlim committee to give it legitimacy and clarify responsibilities. Fourth, outreach should shift from general information to practical, step-by-step guidance for households, accompanied by a waste bank so that separation has an outlet. Fifth, once the financial and institutional foundations are stronger, ProKlim activities could be extended to areas not yet covered, such as energy saving and renewable energy. These measures would also serve the sustainability goals that ProKlim is meant to advance, since a programme that rests on a few unpaid volunteers is unlikely to maintain climate action over the long term.

Comparison with Other ProKlim Sites

The pattern found in RW 08 is not unique to an urban setting. In Sambak village, Magelang, a site that had received the Utama award in 2017 and the Lestari award in 2021, Riani et al. (2024) found that the ProKlim working group was not yet fully effective and that facilities remained insufficient. A rural site with the programme's highest recognition thus shared some of the constraints observed in a young urban site. This parallel supports the reading that ProKlim awards measure what communities manage to achieve rather than the support they receive, and that high categories can coexist with weak organizational foundations.

The urban setting adds its own features. In RW 08, ProKlim was layered on top of two city programmes, Kang Pisman and Buruan Sae, which gave it activities and equipment but also blurred its status. Residents had to separate waste without a waste bank, so the effort of separation produced little visible benefit for them. Urban households are also more likely to have limited time for communal work, which may help explain why participation remained at household level. These differences suggest that the same programme design meets different constraints in rural and urban neighbourhoods, and that support measures should be adapted accordingly.

Theoretical Implications

For implementation research, the case suggests that Edwards III's dimensions should not be treated as independent factors when implementers are volunteers. Disposition can substitute for resources and structure for a time, but the substitution has costs that the model does not register. For co-production and community-based adaptation research, the case adds a concrete instance of a programme in which recognition is the main state input. Recognition without resourcing may be a common configuration in national programmes that reward local achievement, and it deserves attention as a distinct form of co-production in which the state's contribution is mainly symbolic.

CONCLUSION

ProKlim implementation in the neighbourhood studied was under way but not yet optimal. In communication, outreach had not reached all residents and residents were unsure of concrete steps. In resources, implementation depended on eight committee members and on residents' contributions, without any government budget. In disposition, the commitment of the committee and the urban village was high, but residents' participation was limited to household activities and there were no incentives. In bureaucratic structure, technical guidance existed, but no letter of assignment had been issued. The main constraints were the small committee, scarce facilitation, dependence on residents' contributions, and the lack of a formal mandate. Measures included an incentive drawn from contributions, collaboration with universities and communities, prioritizing activities, seeking corporate support, and preparing a letter of assignment.

The case shows a pattern of recognition without resourcing: the state rewards community achievement, while the costs and labour of implementation are borne by the community. High committee commitment compensated for weak resources and structure, but this arrangement is vulnerable to

volunteer fatigue and hard to replicate. For ProKlim to be sustainable, recognition needs to be accompanied by funding, facilitation, and a formal mandate for neighbourhood committees.

SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has several limitations that point to further research. The fieldwork was limited in scope and involved four informants. Officials of the city environment agency, which is responsible for guiding ProKlim, were not interviewed, so accounts of facilitation and funding come only from the committee and the urban village. Future research should include agency officials and examine how facilitation and funding decisions are made at city level.

Figures such as the estimate that about half of residents were active and understood the programme are informants' estimates rather than survey results. A household survey in ProKlim neighbourhoods would make it possible to measure participation and to distinguish household from collective involvement more precisely. The study also lacked quantitative data on ProKlim outputs, such as the volume of waste processed or the number of trees planted, and on the scoring that produced the Pratama and Madya categories. Analysis of assessment records would show which components drive category changes and whether they reflect resourced or self-financed activities.

Finally, the study covered one neighbourhood. The pattern of recognition without resourcing should be tested in other ProKlim sites, including sites that did not move up a category and sites that receive regular local government funding. Comparing such sites would show whether public funding changes the role of committee commitment and whether it makes community climate action more durable.

CO-AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION

The authors declare no conflict of interest in this article. All authors contributed to the conception and design of the study, the analysis and interpretation of the data, and the writing and revision of the manuscript, and all authors approved the final version.

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